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Amuterof studies find significant. tezçcral variation in the interest-
rate response to nancy annwrcencnt surprises. An unresolved qestion,
hcMever, is whether the response cbanes insediately as different policy
reqines are adopted, or whether the tharqe is gradual reflectirnj the
establishment of Federal Reserve credibility. This paper corducts tests that
alla'z for beth discrete shifts in the interest—rate response to noney
arincaincements arid a gradual evolution in this response. The evidence is
consistent with the hypothesis that tcsiçoral variation in the interest-rate
response is limited to discrete shifts in October 1979, October 1982, arid
February 1984.
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Seattle, WA 981951. Introduction
Lucas (1976) argues that empirical economic relations can change
when different policy rnles are adopted. How rapidly these relations
change to reflect new regimes, however, is an unanswered qnestion. The
transition will be gradual if it takes time for policymakers to establish
credibility. On the other hand, if policymakers are credible, economic
relations can change abruptly.Even if policymakers are credible,
however, the transition can be gradual if agents require time to learn the
empirical implications of the new regime [Taylor (1975) and Friedman
(1979)].
The behavior of the interest-rateresponse to money
announcements across Federal Reserve policy regimes provides an
example of the Lucas critique. Roley (1982, 1983) and Cornell (1983)
find evidence that the response of the 3-month Treasury bill yield rises
after the announced policy change in October 1979.Similarly, Roley
(1986) finds evidence that the response falls after the announced policy
change of October 1982.Finally, Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) and
Roley (1986) find that the bill-yield response falls following the
annonnced policy change of February 1984.
These policy regimes can be characterized by three factors [Roley
and Walsh (1985) and Roley (1987)]: the type of operating procedure --
federalfunds rate, nonborrowed reserves, or borrowed reserves; the degree
of desired monetary control; and the type of reserve requirements system-- laggedor contemporaneous. One can use these three factors to explain
the temporal variation in the bill yield's response under the policy
anticipation hypothesis [Grossman (1981) and Urich and Wachtel
(1981)], the expected inflation hypothesis [Cornell (1983)], or some
combination of these two hypotheses [1-Jardouvelis (1985)j. Under the
policy anticipation hypothesis, goods prices are sticky in the short run
implying that the interest-rate response arises from movements in the
real rate. In contrast, under the expected inflation hypothesis, goods
prices are perfectly flexible implying that the response reflects changes in
the inflation premium embedded in nominal yields. Regardless of the
hypothesis, however, the empirical tests described above assume that the
market adjusts immediately to a policy regime change.
Several recent studies question whether the interest-rate response
changes immediately following a policy regime change. Belongia, Hafer,
and Sheehan (1988) and Hardouvelis and Barnhart (1989), for example,
use a Kalman filtering procedure to estimate time series of interest-rate
responses to money surprises.They conclude from the smooth
appearance of these time series that the Federal Reserve was nnable to
establish credibility immediately following the October 1979 and October
1982 announced policy changes. Instead, they argue that their results
illustrate a gradual evolution in Federal Reserve credibility. The basis
for their argument is the belief that the Kalman filter setup is more
general than a model that allows for a few discrete shifts in the interest-rate responseThis belief is incorrect.Response innovations in the
Kalman fitter model are normally distributed. Thus the model makes
scenarios with a few large shifts in the interest-rate response extremely
unlikely. To illustrate this, we conduct bootstrap simulations using a
model in which the interest-rate response undergoes three discrete shifts.
Time series of Kalman filter response estimates computed using these
data appear smooth. That is, the Kalman filter procedure does not
reveal discrete shifts in the interest-rate response.1It is also true,
however, that models that allow only for discrete shifts cannot reveal
evideuce of gradual change in the interest-rate response.
We conduct tesis in this paper that allow for both discrete shifts
and gradual change in the interest-rate response to money surprises as
different monetary policy regimes are announced. Thus the tests enable
one to determine whether the response shifted immediately following the
announced policy changes of October 1979, October 1982, and February
1984. Our results are generally consistent with the hypothesis that
temporal variation in the interest-rate response to money surprises is
limited to discrete shifts immediately following these three announced
policy changes.
We also test whether the dates of estimated regime changes differ
significantly from the dates of the announced policy changes. We use the
Quandt procedure to estimate the dates of regime changes. Loeys (1985)
uses a variant of this procedure to estimate the dates of shifts iu theinterest rate-money surprise relation.ile identifies October 1979 and
August 1981 as the most likely dates of breaks in the relation. He does
not, however, use these estimates to conduct significance tests. We use a
longer time series and identify breaks in Marcb 16, 1978, September 6,
1979, and October 22, 1982, Two of these three dates are close to the
announced policy changes of October 6, 1979 and October 5, 1982. On
the other hand, the third date is very different from the announced policy
change of February 1, 1984. To judge the significance of these results we
conduct bootstrap simulations. The results of the simulations indicate
that the Quandt procedure is unreliable in identifying regime changes.
Based on the simulated distribution of identified regime changes, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that regime changes occurred on the
announced policy changes of October 6, 1979, October 5, 1982, and
February 1, 1984. As a whole, therefore, the results of our tests are
consistent with the hypothesis that empirical economic relations change
immediately following Federal Reserve policy changes. The simulation
evidence also indicates, however, that the power of these tests is low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data. Section 3 provides the results of discrete shift tests, Kalrnan
filter tests, tests that allow for discrete shifts and gradual change, and
Quandt tests. Section 4 contains bootstrap simulations that investigate
the use of Kalman filtering when there are discrele shifts, and that
investigate the distribution of regime changes revealed by the Quaudtprocedure. Finally, section 6 provides conclusions.
2. Data
The data we use in estimating the interest-rate response to money
announcement surprises begin on September 29, 1977, and end on May
26, 1988. The money stock data consist of announced weekly levels of
the narrowly defined money stock Ml, in billions of dollars, from the
Federal Reserve's 11.6release.Before January 31, 1980, the
announcements were made on Thursdays at 4:10 p.m. and corresponded
to changes in "old Ml? After this date the announcements were made
at 4:10 p.m. on Fridays and corresponded first to Mi-B and then to a
definition of Ml equivalent to Mi-B. Beginning on November 29, 1982,
money announcements were made at 4:15 p.m. Finally, starting on
February 16, 1984, money announcements were switched back to
Thursdays, and since March 22, 1984, they have been made at 4:30 p.m.
Expected levels of the money stock are based on the survey data
compiled by Money Market Services international. The survey data
correspond to expected announced changes in Mi, in billions of dollars.
To construct expected levels, the survey value for the expected change is
added to the previous week's announced level.2The money
announcement surprise is then calculated as the difference in the
logarithms of the announced and expected levels of Ml.
The 3-month Treasury bill yield is the main focus of this study,but we also report results for the federal funds rate. Data for both of
these yields are taken from the Federal Reserve's 11.15 release. The
change in the 3-month bill yield is measured from 3:30 p.m. on the day
of a money announcement to 3:30 p.m. on the following business day.
Since money announcements were scheduled to occur at 4:10p.m. or
later,this change incorporates any new information from the
announcement. The change in the federal funds rate is defined similarly,
except that published data are daily-averaged figures.Nevertheless,
quoted rates predominately reflect federal funds trading before 3:30 p.m.
3. Empirical results
We consider a standard efficient-markets specification of the
interest-rate response to money announcement surprises:
Art =t--Pt(m—m)+et, t= 1,2T, (1)
N (0, a)
where Art is the change, in percentage points, in either the 3-month
Treasury bill yield or federal funds rate from 3:30 p.m. on the day of the
announcement to 3:30 p.m. on the next business day, m' andare the
logarithms of the announced and expected levels of Ml, at and t are
regression parameters, tisa serially independent disturbance, andisits variance. firepresentsthe interest-rate response in percentage points
at time t to the announcement of an unexpected one percent increase in
I
Ml.This section investigates how this response behaves over time.
First, we test for discrete shifts in the interest-rate response
immediately following announced policy changes. After that we test a
model in which the response evolves as a random walk.If there are
relatively few large shifts in the response, however, these random walk
tests are unlikely to uncover them. This is because response innovations
in the random walk model are normally distributed. On the other hand,
discrete shift tests cannot uncover gradual change in the interest-rate
response. For these reasons, we also test models in which the interest-
rate response evolves as a random walk, but can undergo large discrete
shifts immediately following announced policy changes. These tests allow
for both immediate and gradual changes in the interest-rate response
following announced policy changes.Finally, we investigate whether
breaks revealed by the Quandt procedure coincide with announced policy
changes.
3.1. Discrete shift tests
Roley (1982, 1983, 1986), Cornell (1983), and Gavin and
Karamouzis (1984) test for discrete shifts in the interest-rate response to
money announcement surprises when policy regimes change. We update
the results of their tests below. We assume that(A.1) a1 —ak
—and, c- = cr,fort E k,
I
wherek denotes the policy regime. Thus the regression parameters take
on different values in each regime but do not vary within regimes. We
choose four regimes on the basis of announced changes in Federal Reserve
policy and interpret the effects of these changes in the framework of the
policy anticipation hypothesis.3
The first regime begins on September 29, 1977, and ends on
October 4, 1979. This regime is characterized by a federal funds rate
operating procedure, some desire by the Federal Reserve to offset
deviations of Ml from its target path, and lagged reserve requirements.
With this characterization, the federal funds rate is fixed within a given
week and should not respond to money announcement surprises. The 3-
month bill yield shonld respond, however, as a positive money
announcement surprise causes investors to increase their assessments
about expected levels of the federal funds rate in future weeks.In
particular money announcement surprises correspond to money demand
prediction errors under lagged reserve requirements. If these errors are
highly persistent and the Federal Reserve offsets them at least partially
4
inthe future, expected future levels of the federal funds rate increase.
Finally, under the expectations hypothesis of the term strncture, the 3-
month bill yield rises immediately.
The second regime begins on October 11, 1979, and ends onOctober 1, 1982. This regime is characterized by a nonborrowed reserves
operating procedure, an increased desire to offset deviations of Ml from
its target path, and lagged reserve requirements. In this case, both the
federal funds rate and the 3-month bill yield shodd respond to money
announcements, and the bill yield's response should be greater than
before. The federal funds rate responds because nonborrowed reserves are
held fixed in the current week and the money announcement surprise
provides information about the current week's demand for reserves.
With nonborrowed reserves fixed, any change in the demand for reserves
is met through the discount window, which requires a change in the
federal funds rate relative to the discount rate. The response of the 3-
mouth bill yield is greater because of this increase in the funds rate and
the Federal Reserve's desire to offset money demand shocks more
quickly.
The third regime spans the October 8, 1982-January 27, 1984
period. This period is characterized by a borrowed reserves operating
procedure, a decreased desire to offset deviations of Ml from its target
path, and lagged reserve requirements.With a positive money
announcement surprise, for example, the demand for reserves will rise.
p.
Underthe borrowed reserves operating procedure, however, nonborrowed
reserves are increased to maintain the federal funds rate-discount rate
spread.This spread is maintained to achieve the borrowed reserves
target. Thus the federal funds rate does not respond. This effect on thecurrent week's funds rate, along with a decreased desire to offset money
demand shocks, causes the bill-yield response to decline.
The final regime begins on February 3, 1984, and spans the
4
remainderof the overall sample to May 26, 1988.This regime is
characterized by a borrowed reserves operating procedure, a further
decline in the desire to offset deviations of Ml from its target path, and
contemporaneous reserve requirements.4 Once again, the federal funds
rate should not respond to money announcement surprises as the Federal
Reserve accomodates any changes in the demand for reserves to maintain
the federal funds rate-discount rate spread. The decreased desire to offset
money announcement surprises most likely causes the bill-yield response
to decline further.5
Estimates of the interest-rate response for the federal funds rate
and the Treasury bill yield in each regime are reported in panel A of
Table 1. Consistent with the predictions outlined above, the federal fund
rate's response is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level
only for the October 1979-October 1982 period. During this period, a
one percent money announcement surprise increases the federal funds rate
by about 35 basis points. The response of the Treasury bill yield is also
4
consistentwith the predictions. In particular, the response increases in
the October 1979-October 1982 period, and then declines in each of the
two remaining periods. The last column in panel A reports test statistics
for the hypothesis that the responses across all four regimes are equal.This hypothesis cart be rejected at less than the one percent significance
level for each interest rate. Moreover, the hypothesis that the bill yield's
response is the same across any pair of adjacent regimes can be rejected
at less than the 1 percent level in every instance-6
One should note, however, that the pattern of the Treasury bill
yield's response is also consistent with the expected inflation hypothesis.
Under this hypothesis, the bill yield's response increases in October 1979
because the Federal Reserve loses credibility as an inflation fighter. Any
positive money surprise, for example, signals that the Federal Reserve
has adopted a higher money growth path. One can interpret the
• declining responses in the last two regimes as the Federal Reserve gaining
increased credibility by offsetting money surprises to achieve an
unchanged long-run money path. In any event, the responses of the bill
yield across the four regimes are statistically different, regardless of the
underlying theory.
3.2. Random walk tests
Belongia, Hafer, and Sheehan (1988) and Hardouvelis and
Barnhart (1989) test a model in which the interest-rate response to
money announcement surprises evolves as a random walk. Following
these authors, we assume that:
(A.2) at =a,a2 =20 =st-i+ 'j,and,yield response is rejected at the one percent significance level, the
hypothesis of temporal stability in the funds-rate response cannot be
rejected at the 5 percent level. The stronger evidence of instability in the
bill-yield response than in the funds-rate response mimics the results of
panel A. On the other hand, the evidence of instability in the funds-rate
response is stronger in panel A than in panel B. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that the funds-rate response shifts immediately
following policy regime changes. This is because panel A's tests are
likely to be more powerful than panel B's tests in detecting this
particular departure from the null hypothesis.
Figure 1 plots the smoothed estimates of the bill-yield response
against time. This figure, like those provided by Belongia, Hafer, and
Sheehan (1988) and Hardouvelis and Barnhart (1989), appears to suggest
that the bill-yield response changes only gradually with time. The
estimation procedure, however, almost guarentees this appearance. The
assumption that response innovations are normally distributed makes a
few large shifts extremely unlikely. In the next section we illustrate this
property using simulations.
3.3. Random walk tests that allow for discrete shifts
To allow for both immediate and gradual changes in the interest-





where Dkt is a dummy that equals one at the kth announced policy
change, and zero otherwise, and 8k is the expected shift in the interest-
rate response at the kth policy change. Once more we use the Kalman
filtering procedure and a grid search to produce maximum likelihood
estimates of 8i' 82, and 83,andP.
Estimates of the shift and random walk parameters appear in
panel A of table 2. The maximum likelihood estimate of the random
walk parameter P is zero irrespective of whether the funds rate or bill
yield is used.Consequently, likelihood ratio tests do not reject the
hypothesis P =0(no stochastic variation) given the presence of discrete
shifts at the announced policy changes. On the other hand, likelihood
ratio tests easily reject the hypothesis of no discrete shifts at the
announced policy changes given stochastic variation at conventional
significance levels.8 Thus the results in panel A are consistent with the
hypothesis that temporal variation in the interest-rate response to money
surprises is limited to discrete shifts immediately following announced
policy changes.
Assumption (A.3) restricts the variance of the disturbance Cttobe
constant across the four regimes.Roley (1986), however, providesevidence against this restriction. To relax the restriction we also conduct
random walk tests regime by regime. Panel B provides the results of
these tests. The maximum likelihood estimate of the random walk
parameter for the funds rate is zero in each regime. On the other hand,
two of the bill-yield parameter estimates are positive.Only the
parameter estimate in the first regime, however, is significantly different
from zero. Thus panel B's results provide little evidence of within-regime
variation in the interest-rate response.
The tests reported in table 2 will lack power if the interest-rate
response follows a process other than a random walk. For this reason, we
also conducted tests within each regime of a model in wbich tbe interest-
rate response follows a stationary autoregressive process.Again,
likelihood ratio tests only reject the hypothesis of a constant response for
the bill yield in the first regime.
3.4. Quandt tests
The Quandt (1958) procedure provides a way to estimate the
timing of discrete shifts in the interest rate-money surprise relation. The
idea behind the procedure is to find breaks that maximize the likelihood
function. Loeys (1985) uses a variant of this procedure recursively to
find breaks in the interest-rate response to money surprises between
November 1977 and December 1983. For the 3-month Treasury bill
yield, the first break Loeys finds is October 1979. Given this break, thesecond break he finds is August 1981. Thus he finds that the interest-
rate response declined over a year before the October 1982 announced
change in monetary policy.
This procedure hasalsobeen used in similar applications. For
example, Huizinga and Mishkin (1985) use the Quandt procedure to find
the optimal two breaks in an ex post real interest rate regression using
monthly data from January 1953 to December 1984. They find that
choosing breaks in October 1979 and October 1982 maximizes the
likelihood function, although they note that the function is quite flat.
Antoncic (1986) also uses a variant of the Quandt procedure to determine
the optimal break in the variance of the real rate from January 1965 to
December 1984. She finds the optimal break to be April 1980.
Here we use the Quandt procedure to find breaks in the interest
rate-money surprise relation. The procedure we use differs in three ways
from Loeys'.First, because of the larger sample, we search for three
breaks, not two. Loeys' sample does not include the announced policy
change of February 1984.Second, the three breaks are found
simultaneously instead of recursively.Recursive searches do not
guarantee a global maximum for the likelihood function. Third, the
Quandt procedure is followed exactly in that residual variances from the
subperiod regressions are allowed to change at the breaks.This
assumption is more appropriate given existing evidence that interest-rate







where Tk is the length of the kth regime. Minimizing (5) with respect to
k' k' and Tk, k =1,2, 3, 4 maximizes the likelihood function.9 In
finding the global minimum of the objective function with respect to the
three breaks simultaneously, over 25 million different combinations of
subsamples are considered to evaluate all possible regimes.
Using the bill-yield we find breaks at observations 25, 102, and
265, which correspond to regimes ending on March 16, 1978, September
6, 1979, and October 22, 1982. Two of these three breaks are fairly close
to the policy regime changes of October 4, 1979 (observation 106) and
October 1, 1982 (observation 262). The third assnmed break on January
27, 1984 (observation 331), however, is not found using this estimation
procedure. Instead, a break is estimated in early 1978.
The asymptotic distribution of the breaks identified by the
Quandtprocedure is unknown. Consequently, we conduct bootstrap
simulations to judge significance. The results of these simulations are
t reported in the next section. The results indicate that the Quandt
procedure often identifies breaks at dates that differ substantially from
the dates of true breaks.Based on the simulated distribution of
estimated breaks, we cannot reject the hypothesis that regime changesoccurred at the announced policy changes of October 4, 1979, October 1,
1982, and January 27, 1984.
4. Simulation results
We conduct bootstrap simulations in this section to demonstrate
that plots of smoothed response estimates against time are unlikely to
reveal discrete shifts in the interest-rate response.We also use
simulations to show that the Quandt procedure is unreliable in correctly
identifying breaks.
4.1. Random walk tests
2,500 time series of bill-yield changes are constructed using a
model in which there are only discrete shifts in the interest-rate response.
We choose parameter values to match estimates reported in panel A of
table 1, and within each regime generate disturbances by sampling from
the regime's residual vector with replacement. For each time series we
produce smoothed response estimates. Figure 2 plots the model interest-
rate response against time, while figure 3 plots the mean smoothed
response estimate against time. Table 3 reports summary statistics for
the estimated innovation in the response over the three regime changes.
This table and figures 2 and 3 together show that when there are discrete
shifts in the interest-rate response, plots of smoothed response estimates
against time are unlikely to identify these shifts. The reason for this isthat the response innovations in figure 2 are not normally distributed.
Three of these innovations are large, while the remainder are zero. The
estimated response innovations, however, are by construction normally
distributed. Thus the estimation procedure guarentees that large discrete
shifts will be eliminated, and the time series will appear smooth.
4.2. Quandt tests
We also use the same discrete-shift model to investigate the
accuracy of the Quandt procedure in identifying breaks in the interest
rate-money surprise relation.Because of the large number of
computations required to find the global minimum of the objective
function (5), however, we conduct only 100replications.As before, the
estimated subperiod relations summarized in panel A of Table 1 are
taken as the true relations, and within each regime disturbances are
sampled with replacement from the regime's residual vector.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 4.Inthe first
row, the probability of identifying all three breaks correctly is estimated
to be 4 percent. Similarly, the probability of identifying any two of the
three breaks correctly, but not the third, is 25 percent. Of more interest,
however, are the subsequent rows, which estimate the probabilities of
obtaining the correct breaks within a range of values. In the fourth row,
for example, the probability of correctly identifying the three breaks to
within 10 weeks is shown to be 39 percent. The probability of finding atleast two breaks within 10 weeks is, however, 97 percent (0.39 + 0.58).
The last row indicates that one of the three breaks may sometimes differ
substantially from its true value. In particular, the probability that the
third break is different from its correct value by at least 80 weeks is 21
percent. The results in this table suggest that the Quandt procedure is
unreliable in correctly identifying three breaks in the interest rate-money
announcement surprise relation.
5. Conclusions
Several recent studies concerning the interest-rate response to
money announcement surprises challenge the assumption that the effect
of different monetary policy regimes can be characterized by discrete
breaks in the response, specified on the basis of Federal Reserve
statements. Two reasons are frequently cited to support this challenge.
First, some events not captured by the October 1979, October 1982, and
February 1984 breaks may have altered the interest-rate response.
Second, adjustment to changes in Federal Reserve policy may be gradual
and changes in policy may occur at times other than those indicated by
Federal Reserve statements.
The question of whether changes in the interest rate-money
surprise relation are gradual or immediate following policy regime
changes is empirical. It is obvious that tests for a small number of
discrete shifts in the interest-rate response cannot reveal evidence of agradual evolution in this response. It is less obvious, but nevertheless
true, that tests of models in which the response follows a random walk
cannot reveal evidence of discrete shifts.This is because response
innovations in the random walk model are normally distributed, and this
limits the frequency with which relatively large innovations can occur.
Thus time series of response estimates produced using this model will
inevitably appear smooth, whether or not there are discrete shifts. 10
This paper conducts tests that allow for both discrete shifts and
gradual change in the interest-rate response to money surprises as policy
changes are announced. We find little evidence against the hypothesis
that temporal variation in the response is limited to discrete shifts. A
further question is whether regime changes occur at announced policy
changes or at other dates. We use the Quandt procedure to identify the
dates at which the interest rate-money surprise relation changes. While
two of the three dates identified are close to the announced policy
changes of Octoher 1979 and October 1982, the third date differs
substantially from the announced policy change of February 1984.
Simulations we conduct, however, show that the Qnandt procedure is
unreliable in correctly identifying breaks. Thus our results are consistent
with the hypothesis that the interest rate-money surprise relation shifted
immediately following announced changes in policy.Footnotes
1.Loeys (1985) uses rolling regressions to examine temporal
variation in the interest-rate response. As he notes, the results of
these regressions also cannot reveal discrete shifts in the response.
Others have investigated whether economic variables explain
temporal variation in the interest-rate response. Strongin and
Tarhan (1990), for example, construct a measure of monetary
policy tightness to explain temporal variation in the reponse, and
suggest that their results are plausible because they mimic those
obtained from rolling regressions.Hardouvelis and l3arnhart
(1989) use inflation, but find it is not a significant determinant of
the bill yield's response. Roley (1982, 1983) uses deviations from
the Federal Reserve's monetary target ranges as a determinant of
the response within policy regimes. He finds evidence that the
response differs within a policy regime depending on whether
ohserved Ml is above, within, or below the Ml target range, and
whether the money surprise is positive or negative. Since these
differing responses are represented by discrete jumps, however,
they are unlikely to be detected by procedures that smooth the
responses over time.
2.We use the reported survey measure of announced money for two
reasons. First, most of the studies mentioned at the outset use thereported measure. Second, the adjusted survey measure proposed
by Roley (1983) is typically calculated for separale policy regimes
which are assumed to be known. Since part of this study concerns
the identification of breaks, this procedure could bias the results in
favor of the previously assumed regimes. Moreover, while the
adjusted measure corrects for biases in the survey data, hypothesis
tests about interest-rate responses are relatively unaffected [Roley
(1983)].
3.The predictions about the responses of interest rates discussed
below are considered in detail by Roley (1987).
4.During the last part of this regime, it may be more accurate to
characterize the operating procedure as a federal funds rate
procedure. The predicted responses are, however, the same in this
case (Roley (1987)].
5.The bill yield's response does not unambiguously decline under
contemporaneous reserve requiements because the error process in
the demand for reserves equation also affects the response. If this
error process is more highly serially correlated than money
demand errors, however, the response unambiguously declines
[Roley (1987)].6.In the tests across the four regimes, as well as in the tests across
adjacent pairs of regimes, the equations in each regime are
weighted by the reciprocals of their estimated standard errors to
correct for heteroscedasticity. The F-statistics and p-values for
the tests that the Treasury bill yield's response is the same in
periods 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4 are F1258 =18.767
(0.000), F1221 =4.926(0-027), and F129121.365 (0.000),
respectively, where p-values are in parentheses.
7. Chow (1983) reviews the use of the Kalman filtering procedure.
8.We conducted bootstrap simulations to investigate the properties
of the likelihood ratio statistics in table 2. Inferences based on the
simulated distributions do not differ substantially from the
inferences we report.An earlier version of the paper also
contained Lagrange multiplier test statistics. With one exception,
inferences based on these statistics do not differ from inferences we
report. The exception concerns tests of the hypothesis of no shifts
given stochastic variation. Table 2 shows that, for both the funds
rate and bill yield, likelihood ratio tests reject this hypothesis.
Lagrange multiplier statistics, on the other hand, do not reject the
hypothesis. Bootstrap simulations we conducted indicate that the
reason for this difference lies in the powers of the two tests. Theresults of these simulations indicate that likelihood ratio tests of
the hypothesis are substantially more powerful than Lagrange
multiplier tests.
9.We also restrict regime lengths to be at least three to avoid having
a regime's sum of squared residuals equal zero.
10.Similarproblems arise in interpreting the results of rolling
regressions [Loeys (1985)].Rollingregression plots of interest-rate
responses can appear smooth because a single estimate can use
data from different regimes. On the other hand, these plots can
display substantial variation because rolling regression estimates
generally use fewer data than, for example, Kalman filter
estimates. We used rolling regressions to test the hypothesis of no
response variation within regimes. Although response estimates
varied substantially within regimes, their large standard errors
ensured that we were unable to reject the hypothesis.References
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Fig.2 Model nerest-rate Ceponse pLotted against time.
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